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We propose a simple model of trooper behavior to design empirical tests for whether troopers of
different races are monolithic in their search behavior, and whether they exhibit relative racial
prejudice in motor vehicle searches. Our test of relative racial prejudice provides a partial solution
to the well-known infra-marginality and omitted variables problems associated with outcome tests.
When applied to a unique data set from Florida, our tests soundly reject the hypothesis that troopers
of different races are monolithic in their search behavior, but fail to reject the hypothesis that
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Black motorists in the United States are much more likely than white motorists to be searched by
highway troopers. Several recent lawsuits against state governments have used this racial disparity
in treatment as evidence of “racial proﬁling,” a term that refers to the police practice of using
a motorist’s race as one of the criteria in their motor vehicle search decisions. Racial proﬁling
originated with the attempt to interdict the ﬂow of drugs from Miami up Interstate 95 to the cities
of the Northeast. For example, in 1985 the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles issued guidelines for police on “The Common Characteristics of Drug Couriers,” in which
race/ethnicity was explicitly mentioned as one characteristic (Engel, Calnon and Bernard, 2002).
While the initial motivation for such guidelines may have been to increase the troopers’ eﬀectiveness
in interdicting drugs, it also unfortunately opened up the possibility for troopers to engage in racist
practices against minority motorists.
Following the public backlash generated by several cases in the 1990s such as Wilkins v. Mary-
land State Police [1996] and Chavez v. Illinois State Police [1999], almost all highway patrol
departments have denounced using race as a criterion in stop and search decisions. But many citi-
zens, especially minorities, are skeptical of this claim: motor vehicle search decisions, by their very
nature, are made in the midst of face-to-face interactions, and thus it is simply hard to imagine
that troopers can block the race and ethnicity information that a motorist presents. Moreover,
data on trooper searches continue to show that they tend to search a higher proportion of minority
m o t o r i s t st h a nw h i t em o t o r i s t s .A si sn o ww e l lk n o w n ,h o w e v e r ,r a c i a ld i s p a r i t i e si nt h ea g g r e g a t e
rates of stops and searches do not necessarily imply racial prejudice (see, for example, Knowles,
Persico and Todd 2001, Engel, Calnon and Bernard 2002). If, for example, black drivers are more
likely than white drivers to carry contraband, then the aggregate rate of stops and searches would
be higher for black drivers even when race was not a factor in troopers’ decision-making. Moreover,
racial proﬁling may also arise if police attempt to maximize successful searches and race helps
predict whether a driver carries contraband. This situation is called statistical discrimination in
the terminology of Arrow (1973).
How can we empirically distinguish racism from statistical discrimination? This question has
garnered enormous public and academic interest (see, for example, National Research Council
2004), but it is also challenging, partly as a result of data limitations. For example, unless truly
random searches are conducted, researchers typically will not observe the true proportion of drivers
who carry contraband. Furthermore, ethnographic studies such as Sherman (1980) and Riksheim
and Chermak (1993) have shown that many situational factors, including suspects’ demeanor in
the police-citizen encounter, inﬂuence police behavior. Such data are also typically unavailable.
Because we have no way of controlling for all of the legitimate factors that might cause minority
1drivers to be searched with higher probability than white drivers, it becomes very diﬃcult to
determine the true motivation behind racial proﬁling with the available data.
One prominent approach that has been used to distinguish between racial prejudice and statis-
tical discrimination is the “outcome test,” whose idea originated in Becker (1957).1 In the context
of motor vehicle searches, the outcome test is based on the following intuitive notion: if troopers
are proﬁling minority motorists due to racial prejudice, they will search minorities even when the
returns from searching them, i.e., the probabilities of successful searches against minorities, are
smaller than those from searching whites. More precisely, if racial prejudice is the reason for racial
proﬁling, then the success rate against the marginal minority motorist (i.e., the last minority mo-
torist deemed suspicious enough to be searched) will be lower than the success rate against the
marginal white motorist. In contrast, if racial proﬁling results from statistical discrimination (i.e.,
if the troopers are proﬁling to maximize the number of successful searches), then the optimality
condition would require that the search success rate against the marginal minority motorist be
equal to that against the marginal white motorist. While this idea has been well understood, it
is problematic in empirical applications because researchers will never be able to directly observe
search success rates against marginal motorists. This is due to the fact that we cannot identify
the marginal motorist, since accomplishing this would require that we had complete information
on all of the variables that troopers use in determining the suspicion level of motorists. Because
of this omitted variables problem, we can only observe the average success rate of searches against
white and minority motorists, and not the marginal success rate. Since the equality of marginal
search success rates does not imply and is not implied by the equality of the average search success
rates, we cannot determine the relationship between the marginal search success rates of white and
minority motorists by looking at average success rates. In past literature this has been referred
to as the infra-marginality problem. These problems severely limit the rigorous application of the
outcome test idea, especially in situations where the decision or the outcome is dichotomous.2
A seminal paper by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001, KPT hereafter) provides the ﬁrst solution
to the infra-marginality problem associated with the outcome test. They develop a simple but
elegant theoretical model about motorist and police behavior and show that in equilibrium the
infra-marginality problem may not arise. In their model, motorists diﬀer in their characteristics,
including race and possibly other factors that are observable to troopers but may or may not be
available to researchers. Troopers decide whether or not to search motorists while motorists decide
1Becker (1993a, 1993b) further elaborated on this idea and Ayres (2001) presented several interesting applications.
2See Ross and Yinger (1999 and 2002, Chapter 8) and Ayres (2002) for detailed discussions of the infra-marginality
problem in the context of mortgage lending and police practices respectively. In fact, in the case of mortgage lending,
Ross (2003) and Ross and Yinger (2002, Chapter 8) argue that the complete elimination of the omitted variable bias
results in a test with no power.
2whether or not to carry contraband. In this “matching pennies”-like model they show that if
troopers are not racially prejudiced, all motorists, if they are searched at all, must in equilibrium
carry contraband with equal probability regardless of their race and other characteristics. Thus in
their model there is no diﬀerence between the marginal and the average search success rates. A
nice feature of the KPT model is that it allows the motorists of diﬀerent races to have diﬀerent
distributions of characteristics, as long as those characteristics are observable to the police (though
they may not be observable to the researcher). Motorists with diﬀerent characteristics may have
diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts from carrying contraband, but these diﬀerences only imply that in
equilibrium troopers will search motorists with diﬀerent characteristics at diﬀerent rates, which
in fact provides the necessary deterrence to ensure that all motorists will carry contraband with
equal probabilities. Because the infra-marginality problem does not arise at all in the equilibrium
of KPT’s simple model, they provide a solid theoretical basis for an empirical test based on the
comparison of the average search success rates by the race of the motorists, a statistic typically
available to researchers. A lower average search success rate implies racial prejudice against that
group. Applying their test to a data set of 1,590 searches on a stretch of the I-95 in Maryland
from January 1995 through January 1999, they ﬁnd no evidence of racial prejudice against African-
American motorists, but do ﬁnd evidence of racial prejudice against Hispanic motorists.
While KPT’s model provides a good starting point to distinguish between racial prejudice and
statistical discrimination empirically, there are a couple of drawbacks to their theoretical model
which cast doubt on the validity of their empirical test. First, KPT’s model predicts that all
motorists of a given race, if they are ever searched, will carry contraband with equal probability
regardless of their other characteristics that may be observed by the police. This is the vital
prediction that allows them to equate the average search success rate in a given racial group of
motorists to the marginal search success rate, thus avoiding the infra-marginality problem. This
prediction, however, also implies that a motorist’s characteristics other than race should provide
no information about the presence of contraband when a trooper decides whether to search. This
implication of police behavior goes against trooper guidelines which require them to base their
search decisions on the information the motorist presents to the trooper at the time of the stop,
including the motorist’s personal characteristics, their demeanor, and the contents of their vehicle
that are in plain view, etc. (see, e.g., Sherman 1980 and Riksheim and Chermak 1993). KPT’s basic
model assumes that motorists’ characteristics are exogenous, thus ruling out the plausible scenario
that a motorist’s actions when stopped are intimately related to whether or not he or she is carrying
contraband. This is not just a minor quibble about details: once we allow the motorists’ actions
when stopped to enter into the oﬃcers’ search decisions, the infra-marginality problem reappears
into the empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the racial proﬁling literature in this paper is
that we develop a more realistic model of trooper behavior that allows oﬃcers to use information
3that they gather about motorists during traﬃc stops when they make their search decisions; and
we exploit the theoretical implications of our model to propose an alternative empirical test to
detect racial prejudice i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fpotential infra-marginality and omitted-variables problems
associated with outcome tests.
The second issue we have concerning KPT (and this ﬁe l do fr e s e a r c hi ng e n e r a l )i st h a tt h e y
implicitly assume that all troopers’ behavior is monolithic. This assumption may not be valid.3
Most existing data sets on police behavior do not contain detailed information about the trooper
characteristics and thus it is assumed that all troopers, regardless of their race, have the same
racial prejudice against minority motorists.4 Donohue and Levitt (2001), in their study on arrest
patterns and crime, ﬁnd that the racial composition of a city’s police force has an important impact
on the racial patterns of arrests, suggesting that police behavior (or information they possess) is
not monolithic. Within the framework of KPT, an invalid monolithic trooper behavior assumption
can lead to wrong conclusion about whether oﬃcers are racially prejudiced. Imagine a world in
which minority troopers are racially prejudiced against white motorists, while white troopers are
prejudiced against minority motorists. It is possible that when examining the aggregate search
outcomes of white and minority troopers, we would reach a conclusion that the police as a whole
are not racially prejudiced. But this may seriously underestimate the harassment experienced
by both white and minority motorists. Our paper deviates from the KPT model and embraces
the possibility that police behavior may vary by their racial group, which is our second main
contribution to the existing literature. As will be shown later, the variation of trooper behavior
by their race will provide the key additional information that allows us to develop our empirical
test.5 We are able to relax the typical assumption that requires troopers to behave monolithically
b e c a u s ew eh a v eaunique data set of highway stops and searches conducted by the Florida Highway
Patrol that contains information on both the race of the trooper making the stop as well as the
information about the motorist that is stopped.
The information we present in Table 1 further illustrates why it is unrealistic to impose the
assumption that all troopers behave monolithically in our Florida data set.6 7 Panels A and B,
respectively, show the search rate given stop and the average search success rate against motorists
3Af o r m a ld e ﬁnition of monolithic behavior is given in Section 3.
4The Maryland data set KPT used has only very limited information about troopers (see KPT 2001 and Barnes
and Gross 2002).
5We are grateful to an anonymous referee for clarifying this important point.
6Table 1 is our main table and we will discuss it more in Section 5.The formal test of monolithic behavior is
presented in Section 5.4.
7The numbers in the column labeled “All Troopers” are calculated directly from the raw data; but the numbers
in the columns labeled “Trooper Race” are calculated from reweighted samples constructed from the raw data. See
Section 4.3 for details about how we construct the reweighted samples.
4Motorist’s Trooper Race All
Race White Black Hispanic -value Troopers






























































Table 1: Search Rates and Average Search Success Rates against Motorists of Diﬀerent Races.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.
for the diﬀerent combinations of motorist and trooper racial groups. The ﬁrst row of Panel A shows
that, of the white motorists stopped by white, black and Hispanic troopers, respectively 0.96, 0.27
and 0.76 percent of them were searched. Monolithic search behavior requires all troopers to search
white motorists at the same rate, which clearly is not the case. Thus any empirical test that relies
on this assumption will not be valid for our data set. The “All Troopers” column in Panel B
of Table 1 also contains the information used in KPT’s test.8 Because the average search success
rates against both black and Hispanic motorists fall below that against white motorists, KPT would
conclude that troopers have racial prejudice towards black and Hispanic motorists. But, when we
admit the possibility that the unobservable characteristics among motorists of diﬀerent races may
diﬀer (in a possibly arbitrary way), we will argue that even such strong disparities in search rates
and average search success rate may not prove racial prejudice.
Our model of trooper search behavior follows the spirit of labor market statistical discrimination
models (see, e.g., Coate and Loury 1993). Police oﬃcers observe noisy but informative signals
about whether or not a driver carries contraband when they decide if a search is warranted. Guilty
drivers, i.e., drivers who actually carry contraband, are more likely than innocent drivers to generate
8More discussion of the KPT test on this data set is provided in Section 5.7.
5suspicious signals. A police oﬃcer incurs a cost of search (;) that depends on both his/her
own race  and the race of the motorist . Troopers of a particular race, say  are said to
be racially prejudiced if their cost of searching motorists depends on the race of the motorist.9
The police force exhibits non-monolithic behavior if the cost of searching motorists of a given race
 d e p e n do nt h er a c eo ft h et r o o p e r . T r o o p e r sa r ea s s u m e dt om a k et h e i rs e a r c hd e c i s i o n st o
maximize the number of successful searches (or arrests). The optimal decision of a race- police
oﬃcer in deciding whether a race- motorist should be searched satisﬁes a threshold property:
motorists should be searched if and only if their posterior probability of being guilty exceeds the
search cost of race- oﬃcers against race- motorists, (;) We show that the police oﬃcers
exhibit monolithic behavior if and only if both the search rate and average search success rate
against any given race of motorists are independent of the race of the troopers conducting the
search. Moreover, if none of the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced, then the ranking
over the race of troopers of search rates and average search success rates against a given race of
motorists should not depend on the race of the motorists. That is, if troopers of race  have a
higher search rate (and lower average search success rate) against race- motorists than troopers
of race 0
 then race- troopers should also have a higher search rate (and lower average search
success rate) against race-0
 motorists than race-0
 troopers. We use these theoretical predictions
of the model to design empirical tests for both monolithic behavior and racial prejudice. The key
idea of our empirical test is as follows: when there is no racial prejudice the race of motorists should
not aﬀect the ranking of search rates and search success rates over oﬃcer races.
An additional desirable feature of our model is that it has direct implications on the ranking of
both the search rates and the average search success rates, and thus our model could potentially
be refuted by the data we have available. It is also important to point out, though, that our test
can only detect what we term to be relative racial prejudice and not absolute racial prejudice. This
is because when the ranking of search rates and search success rates over oﬃcer races depends on
the race of the motorists, we know that at least one of the racial groups of oﬃcers is using racial
prejudice, but we cannot identify which group it is. Thus all we can conclude is that one group of
troopers is more racially prejudiced relative to another group of troopers, instead of an absolute
conclusion which would identify which groups of troopers were racially prejudiced.10
The implementation of our empirical tests relies on data sets that have race information on
both troopers and motorists.11 While such data has not been available for use in earlier empirical
9We assume that race is the only characteristic of troopers that is likely to aﬀect their search behavior. This is
a plausible assumption because we are examining if troopers search white and minority motorists diﬀerently, so the
race of the trooper is the most likely characteristic to aﬀect their search patterns.
10More discussions on this issue is provided in Section 4.2.1 when we discuss the power of our test.
11While our tests can in principle be implemented with only search data (by looking only at average search success
6studies on racial proﬁling, we are able to obtain a data set from the Florida Highway Patrol which
contains information on all vehicle stops and searches conducted on Florida highways between
January 2000 and November 2001, together with the demographics of the trooper that conducted
each stop and search. In implementing our empirical tests, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the Florida
Highway Patrol troopers do not exhibit monolithic behavior, but we fail to reject the hypothesis
that troopers of diﬀerent races do not exhibit relative racial prejudice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some additional discus-
sion of the related literature. Section 3 presents and analyzes our model of trooper search behavior.
Section 4 proposes empirical tests based on the theoretical predictions of the model. Section 5
describes the data set from the Florida Highway Patrol, presents our test results, and contrasts
our results with those using KPT’s test; Section 6 concludes. In Appendix A we present a simple
equilibrium model of drug carrying behavior to show that our focus on trooper behavior in Section
3 is not problematic.
2 Related Literature
Dharmapala and Ross (2004) and Antonovics and Knight (2004) also discussed the possible
shortcomings of the KPT model.12 Dharmapala and Ross (2004) point out that KPT’s test does not
generalize if potential drug carriers may not be observed b yt h ep o l i c eo ri ft h e r ea r ed i ﬀerent levels
of drug oﬀense severity.13 Under those circumstances KPT’s test fails because the infra-marginality
and omitted variables problems re-emerge. More speciﬁcally, the equilibrium of the KPT model
under those circumstances may involve a group of motorists carrying drugs with probability one
(being a “dealer”) even when they are searched with probability one whenever the troopers observe
them. If the probability of being a “dealer” is higher for minorities, then the average success rate
against minorities should be greater than that for whites under statistical discrimination, and equal
average success rates would actually indicate taste discrimination, contrary to KPT’s conclusion.
Antonovics and Knight (2004) argued that KPT’s test may not be robust when its model is
generalized to allow for trooper heterogeneity.14 They also proposed using data with both motorist
rates), having data on all stops would be more desirable because we can then examine whether our model is refuted
by the data besides providing supporting evidence from the search rates.
12Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles (2004) use KPT framework and semi-parametric bounds to reject the oﬃcial
explanation that lower hit rates on minorities are due to higher rates of non-discretionary search using Missouri’s
annual aggregate traﬃc-stop report for the year 2001. Dominitz and Knowles (2004) consider tests of racial prejudice
when oﬃcers are assumed to minimize crime.
13KPT recognized this issue in their footnote 16.
14However, Persico and Todd (2004) show that, if oﬃcers’ goal is to maximize search success rate, rather than total
number of successes, KPT’s test can be generalized to allow for police heterogeneity.
7and oﬃcer information. As we do in our paper, they show that if oﬃcers of diﬀerent races have
the same search cost against motorists of a given race, then the search rate against these motorists
should be independent of the oﬃcers’ race. They run a Probit regression using data from the
Boston Police Department where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a search took
place for a given stop, and the explanatory variables include some observable characteristics of the
driver and oﬃcer and a dummy variable indicating whether there is a racial mismatch between the
oﬃcer and the driver. In their baseline regression, they ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the “racial
mismatch” variable, indicating that oﬃcers are more likely to conduct a search against motorists
of races diﬀerent from their own. They interpret this ﬁnding as evidence of racial prejudice. We
argue in subsection 4.2 that their interpretation of the evidence may be misleading. It is also useful
to point out that their data is from the Boston Police Department and consists mainly of stops
and searches in local neighborhoods. There are two potential problems with such data. First, as
Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles (2004) argued, many stops and searches conducted in local streets
a r ei nr e s p o n s et os p e c i ﬁc crime reports. In these situations, oﬃcers tend to have less discretion
over who they search. Second, as argued by Donohue and Levitt (2001), for stops and searches
conducted in local neighborhoods, it is much more likely that oﬃcers of diﬀerent races may possess
diﬀerent amounts of information about motorists, as residents in the neighborhood may be more
willing to share information with oﬃc e r sw i t ht h es a m er a c ea st h e m .I nc o n t r a s t ,o u rd a t ac o n s i s t s
only of stops and searches conducted on highways, and as a result the above two issues are less
concerning.
We would also like to point out that, besides the “outcome test” approach, a large ﬁeld of
literature has used a diﬀerent statistical test, known as the “benchmarking test,” to test whether
troopers impose disparate treatment on motorists of diﬀerent races.15 16 The benchmarking test
typically compares the shares of racial or ethnic minorities in the population to their shares in the
sample of motorists selected for discretionary stops and searches by police. The main drawback
of the benchmark test is that it cannot determine if racial disparities arise out of racial prejudice
or statistical discrimination. Furthermore, the benchmark test suﬀers from two main problems.
The ﬁrst problem is called the denominator problem, which refers to the question of what should
be the right benchmark to compare the stop and search rates. It ideally should be the racial or
ethnic composition of drivers on the road, but such information is typically unavailable. The second
15Ar e ﬁned version of this test uses regressions to estimate the probability of being searched as a function of race
and other observable characteristics that may be related to propensity to commit crimes. Fridell (2004) provides a
comprehensive review of diﬀerent benchmarks in this approach.
16There are parallel and closely related approaches to test for disparate treatment in the literature on mortgage
lending discrimination (see Ross and Yinger 2002 and Ross 2003 for comprehensive literature reviews). Paired-audit
is a third frequently used method in the context of housing market, mortgage lending and car purchases (Ayres 2001).
8problem is the omitted-variables problem. If there exist certain characteristics whose distributions
a r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hm o t o r i s t s ’r a c eo re t h n i c i t ya n di fs u c hc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sm a yb eo b s e r v e db y
police but not available to researchers, benchmarking tests will not be completely informative
about whether motorists’ race aﬀected the search decision.
3T h e M o d e l
We now present a simple model of trooper search behavior that underlines the empirical work
in Section 5.17 There is a continuum of troopers (interchangeably, police oﬃcers) and motorists
(interchangeably, drivers). Let  and  ∈ {} denote the race of the motorists and the
troopers respectively, where  stands for minorities and  for whites.18 Suppose that among
motorists of race  ∈ {} af r a c t i o n ∈ (01) of them carry contraband.19
The information that is available to an oﬃcer when he or she makes the search decision consists
of the motorist’s race and many other characteristics pertaining to the motorist. Such characteristics
may include, for example, the gender, age and residential address of the driver, the interior of the
vehicle that is in the trooper’s view, the smell from the driver or the vehicle, whether the driver
is intoxicated, the demeanor of the driver in answering the trooper’s questions, the make of the
car, whether the car has an out-of-state plate, whether the car is rented or owned, location and
time of the stop, as well as the seriousness of the reason for the stop, etc.20 Note that while the
police oﬃcer observes all the characteristics in the decision to search, a researcher will typically
have access to only a small subset of them. We assume, however, that the police oﬃcer will use a
single-dimensional index 	 ∈ [01] that summarizes all of the information that these characteristics
indicate about the likelihood that a driver may be carrying contraband.21 We assume that, if a
driver of race  ∈ {} actually carries contraband, then the index 	 is randomly drawn from
a continuous probability density distribution 

 (·);ifarace driver does not carry contraband,
	 would be randomly drawn from 

 (·). [The subscripts  and  stand for “guilty” and “not
17Borooah (2001) and Bjerk (2004) develop somewhat related models of policing behavior.
18In the empirical part of the paper, we will examine three racial or ethnic groups: whites, blacks, and Hispanics.
For now, though, we group blacks and Hispanics together as minorities for ease of exposition.
19For the purpose of deriving our empirical test, we will assume that 
 is exogenous. In Appendix A, we present
an equilibrium model in which 
 is endogenously determined.
20The questions the trooper will ask the motorist are typically focused on where the motorist is headed and the
purpose of their visit. In listening to the response the trooper will try to discern how nervous or defensive the motorist
is, and how logical the motorist’s response is.
21It is useful to think that troopers aggregate their observed variables into the index  by assigning them diﬀerent
weights. The weights troopers assign to a particular variable, however, can be diﬀerent for motorists of diﬀerent
races. For example, Hispanic motorists in Florida tend to have more limited English skills than Whites. Thus the
weights on English skills in the formation of  should diﬀer for Hispanic and White drivers.











 (	) is strictly increasing in 	
The MLRP property on the signal distributions essentially means that a higher index 	 is a
signal that a driver is more likely to be guilty.22 To the extent that there may be obviously guilty
drivers (for example, if illicit drugs are in plain view), we assume that:





 (	) → +∞ as 	 → 1
The MLRP also implies that the cumulative distribution function 
 (·) ﬁrst order stochasti-
cally dominates 
 (·), which implies that drivers who actually carry contraband are more likely
to generate higher and thus more suspicious signals. We think this single dimensional index for-
mulation summarizes the information that is available to troopers when they make their search
decisions on the highway in a simple but realistic manner.
Each police oﬃcer can choose to search a vehicle after observing the driver’s vector (	),
where  is the driver’s race and 	 is the single-dimensional index that summarizes all other
characteristics observed during the stop. We assume that a trooper wants to maximize the total
number of convictions (or the number of drivers found carrying illicit contraband) minus a cost of
searching cars. This is an important assumption because it requires that police oﬃcers always use
any statistical information contained in the race of the motorist in their search decisions.23
Let (;) be the cost of a police oﬃcer with race  searching a motorist with race  where
  ∈ {} We normalize the beneﬁt of each arrest (or successful drug ﬁnd) to equal one,
and scale the search cost to be a fraction of the beneﬁt, so that (;) ∈ (01) for all   It
is worth emphasizing that, diﬀerent from KPT, we allow the troopers’ cost of searching a vehicle
to depend on the races of both the motorist and the oﬃcer, and thus we can directly confront the
possibility that police oﬃcers may not be monolithic in their search behavior.
We now introduce some deﬁnitions. First, a police oﬃcer of race  is said to be racially
prejudiced if he or she exhibits a preference for searching motorists of one race. Following KPT,





in an ascending order. Thus the MLRP assumption is with no loss of generality.
23This is also the police objective postulated in KPT. It is a plausible assumption because awards (such as Trooper
of the Month honors) and/or promotion decisions are partly based on troopers’ success in catching motorists with
contraband. This assumption rules out the possibility that some oﬃcers ignore the race of a motorist even when it
provides useful information. See Section 3.2 for more discussion on this key assumption.
10we model this preference in the cost of searching motorists.24 25
Deﬁnition 1 Ap o l i c eo ﬃcer of race  is racially prejudiced, or has a taste for discrimination, if
(;) 6= (;)
Next, we say that police do not exhibit monolithic behavior if oﬃcers of diﬀerent races do not
use the same search criterion when dealing with motorists of some race.
Deﬁnition 2 T h ep o l i c eo ﬃcers do not exhibit monolithic behavior if (;) 6= (;) for
some  ∈ {}
Note that a monolithic police force does not mean that they are not racially prejudiced: it could
be that police oﬃcers of both races are equally prejudiced against some race of motorists. Likewise,
a non-monolithic police force does not necessarily imply that some racial group of troopers are
racially prejudiced: it could be that each group of troopers has the same search cost against all
groups of motorists, but that search costs depend on the race of the trooper.
3.1 Theoretical Implications
Let  denote the event that the motorist searched is found with illicit drugs in the vehicle.
When a police oﬃcer observes a motorist of race  and signal 	 the posterior probability that











It immediately follows from the MLRP that Pr(|	) is monotonically increasing in 	 From the
unbounded likelihood ratio assumption, we know that Pr(|	) → 1 as 	 → 1
The decision problem faced by a police oﬃcer of race  when facing a motorist with race 
and signal 	 is thus as follows:
max{Pr(|	) − (;);0} (1)
24Strictly speaking, we should have a broad interpretation of the search cost (;) For example, the cost of
decoding the demeanor may be smaller if  =  We are not able to distinguish such cost diﬀerences from racial
prejudice.
25We are interpreting racial prejudice as “consequential animus” in the terminology of Ayres (2001, Chapter 3). In
other contexts such as mortgage lending, racial prejudice may be manifested as “association animus,” i.e., a lender
may be prejudiced against borrowers of a given race by not being willing to engage in transactions with them. We
believe that “consequential animus” is an appropriate interpretation of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches. We
thank an anonymous referee for bringing this distinction to our attention.
11where the ﬁrst term is the expected beneﬁt from searching such a motorist and the second term is
the beneﬁt from not searching, which is normalized to zero. Thus the optimal decision for a trooper
of race  is to search a race- motorist with signal 	 if and only if
Pr(|	) ≥ (;)
From the monotonicity of Pr(|	)i n	 we thus conclude:
Proposition 1 Ar a c e -  police oﬃcer will search a race- motorist if and only if
	 ≥ 	∗ (;)
where 	∗ (;) is uniquely determined by
Pr(|	∗ (;)) = (;)
Moreover, the search threshold 	∗ (;) is monotonically increasing in (;)
Proposition 1 says that the probability of a successful search for the marginal motorist is equal
to the cost of search. Any infra-marginal motorist will have a higher search success probability. In
what follows, we will refer to 	∗ (;)a st h eequilibrium search criterion of race- police oﬃcers
against race- motorists. We deﬁne the equilibrium search rate of race- police oﬃcers against





+( 1 − )[1 − 
 (	∗ (;))] (2)
The equilibrium average search success rate of race- police oﬃcers against race- motorists,






 [1 − 
 (	∗ (;))] + (1 − )[1 − 
 (	∗ (;))]
 (3)
We say that race- police oﬃcers exhibit statistical discrimination if they have no taste for
discrimination and yet they use diﬀerent search criterion against motorists with diﬀerent races.
Deﬁnition 3 Assume (;)=(;) Then race- police oﬃcers exhibit statistical discrim-
ination if 	∗ (;) 6= 	∗ (;)
Oﬃcers will choose to use statistical discrimination if the distribution of the signal 	 among
white and minority motorists is diﬀerent. When these distributions diﬀer and (;)=(;)
(as assumed), Proposition 1 implies that the race- police will choose search criteria 	∗ (;)a n d
	∗ (;) so that the marginal search success rates against white and minority motorists are both
12equal to the search cost. This typically implies that 	∗ (;) 6= 	∗ (;). One reason why the
distribution of the signal 	 might be diﬀerent across motorists of diﬀerent races is that one group
might be more likely to carry contraband. For example, if minority drivers are more likely to carry
contraband (  ), then it will be optimal for a non-prejudiced oﬃcer to search relatively
more minority drivers (assume everything else is the same for white and minority drivers), and thus
they will set 	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;). Another reason why the distribution of 	 might be diﬀerent
for whites and minorities is that 

 (	)a n d

 (	)c a nd i ﬀer between motorist races.
N o ww ed e r i v es o m es i m p l ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h em o d e lt h a tw i l ls e r v ea st h eb a s i so fo u re m p i r i c a l
test. First, note that if police oﬃcers are monolithic, then the cost of searching any given race of
m o t o r i s t si st h es a m e ,r e g a r d l e s so ft h er a c eo ft h eo ﬃcer. That is, (;)=(;)a n d
(;)=(;). If we assume that white and minority troopers face the same population of
white motorists and the same population of minority motorists, then Proposition 1 implies that
both races of oﬃcers will use the same search criterion against a given race of motorists,26 so that
	∗ (;)=	∗ (;)a n d	∗ (;)=	∗ (;) Thus, following from the formula for the
search rate (2) and average search success rate (3), we have:
Proposition 2 If the police oﬃcers exhibit monolithic behavior, then  (;)= (;) and
 (;)= (;) for all  ∈ {}
Next, if none o ft h ep o l i c eo ﬃcers are racially prejudiced, then it immediately follows from
Deﬁnition 1 that the ranking of (;)a n d(;) does not depend on the motorist’s race
 regardless of whether or not troopers are monolithic.27 We can illustrate the implication of
this using an example where white troopers ﬁnd searching both minority and white motorists more
costly than minority troopers do. More formally this can be written as (;)=(;) 
(;)=(;).28 Because the search threshold given in Proposition 1 is monotonically
increasing in (;) and both white and minority troopers face the same population of white
and minority motorists, this implies that 	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;)a n d	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;).
Because the equilibrium search rate given in formula (2) is monotonically decreasing in 	∗ (;)
26In Section 4.3 we describe a resampling procedure to empirically deal with data sets in which this assumption
may be invalid in the raw data.
27Consider, for illustrative purposes, the case that (;	) 
 (;). Since race-	 oﬃcers are assumed not to be
racially prejudiced, we have (;	)=(	;	) Similarly since race- oﬃcers are not racially prejudiced, we have
(;)=(	;) Thus it must be the case (	;	) 
 (	;). Thus (;	) 
(;) for all  Similar
arguments show that if (;	)  (;), then we must have (	;	)  (	;); and if (;	)=(;)t h e n
we must have (	;	)=(	;). Thus the ranking of (;	)a n d(;) does not depend on the motorist’s
race .
28Note that the relationship (	;)=(;)d o e sn o ti m p l yt h a t
∗(	;)=
∗(;), because troopers can
be engaged in statistical discrimination.
13we immediately have that  (;)  (;)a n d (;)  (;), so that race-
oﬃcers’ search rates will be higher for both races of motorists. Similarly, if (;)=(;) 
(;)=(;), then race- oﬃcers’ search rates will be lower for both rates of motorists
than race- oﬃcers. Finally, if (;)=(;)=(;)=(;), then race- oﬃcers’
search rates will be equal to those of race- oﬃcers for both races of motorists.
We can also show that if none of the police oﬃcers are racially prejudiced, then the rank order of
average search success rates between white and minority troopers for any race of motorists should
also be independent of the motorists’ race. Recall the previous example where white troopers had
a higher overall search cost than minority troopers. We showed this would imply that 	∗(;) 
	∗(;)a n d	∗(;) 	 ∗(;). The average search success rate with a search criterion 	∗





 [1 − 
 (	∗) ]+( 1 − )[1 − 
 (	∗)]

a n do n ec a ns h o wt h a ti ti ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi n	∗29 Thus we have  (;) (;)a n d
 (;) (;) That is, the ranking of  (;)a n d (;) does not depend on 
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If neither race- nor race- of police oﬃcers exhibit racial prejudice, then neither
the ranking of  (;) and  (;) nor the ranking of average search success rates  (;)
and  (;) depends on  ∈ {} Moreover, for any  the ranking of  (;) and
 (;) should be the exact opposite of the ranking of  (;) and  (;)30
In our model if race- troopers are not racially prejudiced, we know that race- troopers’
marginal search success rate against white motorists will be equal to their marginal search success
rate against minority motorists. But because in our model the marginal motorist’s guilt probability
is smaller than that of the infra-marginal motorists, we can not conclude that race- troopers’
average search success rate against white motorists will be equal to their average search success
rate against minority motorists. This is in stark contrast to KPT’s model where there is no
29To see this, note that it will be strictly increasing in 













is strictly increasing in 





































∗) thus the integrand in the numerator
is always positive. Hence 
0 (
∗)  0
30The last statement in Proposition 3 holds regardless of whether or not troopers are racially prejudiced.
14distinction between marginal and average motorists. Nonetheless, Proposition 3 provides robust
testable implications of our model based on rank orders of observable statistics — the search rates
and the average search success rates.31
The contrapositive of Proposition 3 is simply that, if the ranking of  (;)a n d (;)
or the ranking of  (;)a n d (;) depend on ,t h e nat least one racial group of the
troopers exhibit racial prejudice. Without further assumptions, it is not possible to determine
which group of troopers are racially prejudiced.
3.2 Discussion of the Model





 to be speciﬁc to the racial group of the drivers. This ﬂexibility is important if we intend to use
our model as a basis for an empirical test. As we explained in the introduction, black and white









  respectively, would be a very strong assumption
and may be empirically implausible. Indeed, it is possible for example that minority drivers not
carrying contraband might tend to be more nervous during a stop than whites. Also note that,
since 	 is most likely not observable by researchers, we do not want to impose parametric distri-
butional assumptions. While sharper tests may be designed if we were to impose more parametric




  the desirable feature of our test is its robustness.
Despite this ﬂexibility, our formulation does assume that the signals of race- motorists are
drawn from the same distributions independent of police oﬃcers’ race. For example, we do not allow
for the possibility that minority drivers will present a signal that is drawn from one distribution
when they are stopped by a minority trooper and another signal that is drawn from a diﬀerent
distribution when they are stopped by a white trooper. This would be a suspicious assumption,
for example, if the stops and searches occur on local streets. As argued in Donohue and Levitt
(2001), a black community may be more willing to cooperate with a black oﬃcer, and thus black
oﬃcers may obtain more information about a black motorist on the streets. However, we maintain
that this is a realistic assumption in highway searches. When stopping a black driver on highways,
a trooper typically does not have any other citizens to rely on for additional information. Thus
any informational advantage that black oﬃcers have about black motorists on local streets may
not extend to the highways. Thus as long as white and black troopers observe the same list of
characteristics and summarize them in the same way, our assumption will be valid.
31Proposition 3 provides testable implications on the rank orders of both search rate and average search success
rates. In this regard, our test is in agreement to Ross and Yinger (2002, Chapter 8) in the context of mortgage lending
discrimination, where they emphasize the inextricable link between loan approval decisions and loan performance (see
also Ross 1997).
15One may also argue that minority drivers might be more nervous with white oﬃcers than they
are with minority oﬃcers, regardless of whether or not they are carrying contraband. But as long as
white oﬃcers properly take this fact into account, they should put a lower weight on the observed
nervousness from a black motorist when they formulate the signal index 	 Thus this argument




 d on o td e p e n do nt h er a c eo ft h e
police oﬃcers 
Assumptions on the Oﬃcers’ Optimization Problem. We assume in oﬃcers’ optimization
problem (1) that they maximize the total number of convictions minus a cost of searching cars.
We also assume that oﬃcers exploit all statistically valid racial inferences in making their search
decisions. Our assumption that troopers will always use the race of motorists as a factor in deciding
whether or not to search is not necessarily at odds with the oﬃcial policies on racial proﬁling. Most
highway patrol departments prohibited using race as the primary cause for police-citizen contact,
but did not rule out using it as one of many factors. For example, California Highway Patrol
prohibits racial proﬁling which it deﬁned as occurring “when a police oﬃcer initiates a traﬃco r
investigative contact based primarily on the race/ethnicity of the individual.”32 Federal courts
have ruled that race cannot be the only basis for search and seizure, but it can be one among other
factors (see, for example, Whren v. United States [1996] and United States v. Waldon [2000]).
Finally, in oﬃcers’ optimization problem (1), we assume that they do not have search capacity
constraints and thus they judge each stopped vehicle individually to determine whether it is worth
as e a r c h .B u ti fo ﬃcers did have a search capacity constraint they would choose to search only the
most suspicious motorists. In reality, however, capacity constraints are not likely to be important:
in our data, an oﬃcer has on average less than 7 searches in a span of almost two years. One might
also think that an oﬃcer may also care about the quality of the contraband found and that this
should be reﬂected in their objective function, but unfortunately we do not have such information
in our data set and thus cannot include this in our model.33
Assumption on the Pool of Motorists Faced by Troopers of Diﬀerent Races. In the
model, we assume that the fraction of race- motorists carrying contraband  ∈ (01)d o e sn o t
depend on the race of the troopers searching them. That is, we assumed that the pools of motorists
faced by troopers of diﬀerent races are the same. This assumption may not be empirically valid if
white and minority troopers are systematically assigned to patrol in diﬀerent locations and diﬀerent
times of the day (indeed, our raw data indicate that this is the case — see Tables 4 and 5). In Section
32See California Highway Patrol Public Contact Demographic Data Summary (p.1).
33T h eM a r y l a n dd a t as e tu s e db yK P Td o e sc o n t a i nt h eq u a n t i t yo fd r u gf o u n di nt h es e a r c h e s( s e eK n o w l e s ,
Persico and Todd 2001).
164.3 we describe a resampling procedure to deal with this problem empirically.
4 Empirical Tests
4.1 Test for Monolithic Trooper Behavior
Proposition 2 suggests a test for whether troopers of diﬀerent races exhibit monolithic search
behavior that is implementable even when researchers have no access to the signals 	 observed by
troopers in making their search decisions. Under the null hypothesis that police oﬃcers exhibit
monolithic behavior, then, for any race of drivers, the search rates and average search success rates
against drivers of that race should be independent of the race of the troopers that conduct the
searches. That is, under the null hypothesis of monolithic trooper behavior, we must have, for all
 ∈ {}
 (;)= (;) (4)
 (;)= (;) (5)
Any evidence in violation of any of these equalities would reject the null hypothesis.
It is worth pointing out that both equalities (4) and (5) hold if and only if the null hypothesis
is true. To illustrate why this is true we need to show that when the null hypothesis is not true
we will never satisfy equality (4) and (5). Without loss of generality, suppose that troopers are not
monolithic in their search behavior against white motorists ( = ) That is, (;) 6= (;).
If (;)  (;), then, because both white and minority troopers face the same population
of white motorists, we know from Proposition 1 that 	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;), i.e. white troopers
will use a more strict search criterion than minority troopers when searching white motorists. This
then simultaneously implies that (;)  (;)a n dt h a t(;)  (;), following
from the proof in footnote 29. Thus the test using either (4) and (5) has an asymptotic power of
one.
Moreover, the relationship between search rates and average search success rates suggests that,
in principle, our model can be refuted. According to our model, whenever (;)  (;)
this must be because 	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;) which directly implies that (;)  (;).
Thus if the rank order between the search rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race
of motorists is not exactly the opposite of the rank order between the average search success rates,
then we know that at least some of the conditions of our model are not satisﬁed.34
34Of course, if the search rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race of motorists are equal, then the
average search success rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race of motorists must also be equal.
174.2 Test for Racial Prejudice
Proposition 3 suggests a test for whether some racial groups of troopers exhibit racial prejudice
in their search behavior. Under the null hypothesis that none of the racial groups of troopers have
racial prejudice, it must be true that both the ranking of search rates for a given race of motorists
 across the races of troopers [ (;)a n d (;)] and the ranking of average search success
rates [ (;)a n d (;)] do not depend on  ∈ {} The null hypothesis will be
rejected if the ranking of  (;)a n d (;), or the ranking of  (;)a n d (;)
depends on the race of the motorists 
4.2.1 Power of the Test
Two features of our empirical test for racial prejudice are worth discussing in further detail.
First, our test will only indicate whether or not there is a “relative bias” among troopers. This
i sb e c a u s ew h e nw ed oﬁnd evidence of racial prejudice, we only know that at least one racial
group of oﬃcers are racially prejudiced, but cannot determine which one. Second, the power
of our test is not one, even when the sample size goes to inﬁnity. To illustrate, suppose that
the truth is (;)=(;)  (;)  (;). That is, race- oﬃcers are not
racially prejudiced, but race- oﬃcers are prejudiced against minorities (race- oﬃcers’ cost of
searching minority motorists is smaller). In this case, race- oﬃcers will apply higher search
criteria toward both races of motorists, and thus the race- oﬃcers’ search rates will be lower
regardless of the race of the motorists. Therefore the null hypothesis is not rejected even it is
false and we as a result commit a type-II error. In general, our test has an asymptotic power of
zero if [(;) − (;)][(;) − (;)]  0;35 and it has an asymptotic power of one
if [(;) − (;)][(;) − (;)]  0
The low power of our test may be considered a weakness of our test. On the other hand, if
we do ﬁnd evidence against the null hypothesis, we can be quite conﬁdent that at least one racial





 do not depend on  then one can derive more powerful tests for racial prejudice.
Our test can be considered to be the robust implication from a plausible behavioral model that
does not impose strong and unveriﬁable distributional assumptions.36
Finally it is worth pointing out that even though our test has low power, it is able to detect
racial prejudice when we apply it to the Boston data analyzed in Antonovics and Knight (2004).
35This will be true either when (;) (;	)a n d(	;) (	;	), or when (;) 
(;	)a n d
(	;) 
(	;	). That is, our test will fail to detect relative racial prejudice if the troopers of some race have
smaller (or larger) costs of searching drivers of any race than troopers of other races.
36In this regard, our position is similar to Manski (1995) who preached the tolerance of ambiguity in empirical
research in social sciences.
18Their table 1 indicates that in their data, black oﬃcers’ search rate is higher than white oﬃcers
against white motorists; but white oﬃcers’ search rate is higher than black oﬃcers against black
motorists. This is a violation of the rank order independence for search rates, which indicates that
at least one racial group of the oﬃcers are racially prejudiced.37
4.2.2 Diﬀerence From Test of Antonovics and Knight (2004)
Now we relate our test of racial prejudice to the test proposed in Antonovics and Knight (2004).
As we described in the introduction, they use evidence that police oﬃcers are more likely to conduct
as e a r c hi ft h er a c eo ft h eo ﬃcer diﬀers from the race of the driver as evidence of racial prejudice.
First, it is useful to point out that their test is diﬀerent from our rank order test proposed above.
Consider the following simple example. Suppose that   ∈ { } and let the search rates
be as follows:  (;)=05(;)=10(;)=20 and  (;)=15 That is,
minority oﬃcers are more likely to search white motorists than minority motorists, and white
oﬃcers are more likely to search minority motorists than white motorists. Thus oﬃcers in this
example are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the motorist is diﬀerent from their own,
causing Antonovics and Knight’s test to conclude that racial prejudice is occurring. However, such
patterns of search rates satisfy our rank independence condition, that is,  (;) (;)f o r
 ∈ {} and thus our test would not consider this as evidence of racial prejudice.38 If we
allow for arbitrary diﬀerences, including higher moments, in the signal distributions between white

















coeﬃcient on “racial mismatch” can be consistent with the hypothesis that both racial groups of
oﬃcers are not prejudiced, even though they must behave non-monolithically. We would like to
emphasize, however, that we do not mean to say that our test proves no racial prejudice: our
conclusion is simply that no racial prejudice could not be ruled out by the data without making
stronger and non-veriﬁable distributional assumptions on the signal distribution.
A second diﬀerence between Antonovics and Knight’s (2004) test and ours is that we use both
search rate and average search success rates in our test, while their test uses only search rates.
Using both pieces of information permits us to potentially refute our behavioral model on which
our test is based. We think this is an additional strength of our test (see Ross and Yinger 2002,
Chapter 8 for related discussion in the context of mortgage lending).
37Their paper did not present information about average search success rates which, as we remarked earlier, could
have been used to potentially refute our model.
38When we ran Probit regressions as speciﬁed in Table 6 of Antonovics and Knight (2004) on our Florida data set,
the coeﬃcient on the “racial mismatch” variable is positive and signiﬁcant (the point estimate is about 0.1 with a
robust standard error of 0.013). Thus their test, in contrast to ours, would have concluded racial prejudice.
194.3 A Resampling Procedure
As we mentioned in Section 3.2, our model assumes that the fraction of race- motorists
carrying contraband  ∈ (01) does not depend on the race of the troopers searching them.
Our raw data, summarized in Tables 4 and 5, indicates that white and minority troopers are
systematically assigned to patrol in diﬀerent locations and at diﬀerent times of the day, and thus
might face diﬀerent populations of motorists. We will not explain an empirical method that can
possibly resolve this problem so that we can use our empirical test even when the raw data does
not satisfy this condition. For illustration purposes, suppose that there are two troop stations,
denoted 1 and 2 each with 100 oﬃcers. Suppose that in station 1,8 0o ﬃcers are white and 20 are
minorities; in station 2, 60 oﬃcers are white and 40 are minorities. Thus, on average 70 percent
of the troopers are white and 30 percent are minorities. If the motorists that drive through the
patrol areas of stations 1 and 2 diﬀer in their characteristics, then the assumption that on average
w h i t ea n dm i n o r i t yt r o o p e r sf a c et h es a m ep o o lo fm o t o r i s t sm a yb ei n v a l i d .T od e a lw i t ht h i si s s u e
we create reweighted samples in the following way. We keep all the minority oﬃcers (20 of them)
in station 1, but randomly select 47 out of the 80 white oﬃcers. Similarly, we keep all the white
oﬃcers (60 of them) in station 2, but randomly select 26 out of the 40 minority oﬃcers. Thus we
create a reweighted sample of 107 white oﬃcers and 46 minority oﬃcers. Among the 153 oﬃcers
in the artiﬁcial sample, (roughly) 70 percent of them are whites and 30 percent are minorities, and
they are equally likely to be assigned to stations 1 and 2. We can calculate the various search rates
and average search success rates in this reweighted sample. To alleviate the sampling error, we use
independent resampling to create a list of such reweighted data sets.39
This resampling method can eﬀectively ensure that, when we calculate the search rates and
average search success rates, the white and minority oﬃcers in the sample are assigned to diﬀerent
trooper stations with equal probability. Thus on average, white and minority oﬃcers are facing the
same pool of motorists.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Data Description
We now apply the tests described above to data from the Florida State Highway Patrol. The
Florida data is composed of two parts. The ﬁrst is the traﬃc data set that consists of all the
39As pointed out by a referee, our resampling procedure is reminiscent of the “reweighting” method proposed
in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) in the context of decomposing the eﬀects of insitutional and labor market
factors on changes in the U.S. wage distributions. The main diﬀerence from our procedure is that we use independent
multiple resampling to alleviate sampling error.
20stops and searches conducted on all Florida highways from January 2000 to November 2001.F o r
each of the stops in the data set, it includes (among other things) the date, exact time, county,
driver’s race, gender, ethnicity, age, reason for stop, whether a search was conducted, rationale
for search, type of contraband seized, and the ID number of the trooper who conducted the stop
and/or search. This part of the data is similar to those used in earlier studies of racial proﬁling
(e.g. KPT 2001 and Gross and Barnes 2002).40 The unique feature of our data set is the second
part, which is the personnel data that contains information on each of the troopers that conducted
the stops and searches in the traﬃc data set, including their ID number, date of birth, date of
hiring, race, gender, rank, and base troop station. We merge the traﬃcd a t aa n dt h ep e r s o n n e l
data by the unique trooper ID number that appears in both data sets. The merged data set thus
provides information about the demographics of the trooper that made each stop and search. After
eliminating cases in which there was missing information on the demographics of the trooper that
conducted the stop, we end up with 906,339 stops and 8,976 searches conducted by a total of 1,469
troopers.41 Florida State Highway Patrol troopers are assigned to one of ten trooper stations.
Except for trooper station K, which is in charge of the Florida Turnpike, all other stations cover
ﬁxed counties. Figure 1 shows the coverage area of diﬀerent troop stations.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the means of the variables related to the motorists in our sample. Of
the 906339 stops we observe, 66.5 percent were carried out against white motorists, 17.3 percent
against Hispanic motorists, and 16.2 percent against black motorists. In all race categories of the
motorists, male motorists account for at least 67 percent of the stopped motorists. Among all the
motorists that were stopped, 48 percent were in the 16-30 age group, 33.6 percent were in the
31-45 age group and 18.3 percent were 46 and older. Close to 90 percent of stopped motorists have
in-state license plates, and close to 70 percent of the stops were conducted in the daytime (deﬁned
to be between 6am and 6pm).
Of the 8,976 searches we observe, 54.6 percent were performed on white motorists, 23.4 percent
on Hispanic motorists, and 22.1 percent on black motorists. In all race categories, more than 80
percent of searches were performed on male motorists, and overall, 84.8 percent of searches were
against male drivers. Among the motorists that were searched, 58.4 percent were in the 16-30
age group, 31.7 percent were in the 31-45 age group and only 9.9 percent were in the 46 and
older age group. Vehicles with in-state plates account for 85.7 percent of the searches, and 52.5
40Even though KPT have data on the stops, they did not use them in their analysis. Gross and Barnes (2002)
provided some basic statistics about the stop data.
41We also eliminated cases where the race of the motorist and trooper was not either white, black, or Hispanic,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Troop Station Coverage Map.
22Stops Searches
Motorists’ All By Motorist Sex All By Motorist Sex
Characteristics Stops Female Male Searches Female Male
Black .162 (.368) .327 (.470) .673 (.470) .221 (.415) .146 (.354) .851 (.354)
Hispanic .173 (.378) .225 (.417) .775 (.471) .234 (.423) .098 (.296) .902 (.296)
White .665 (.472) .319 (.466) .681 (.466) .546 (.498) .178 (.382) .822 (.382)
Female .304 (.460) 1.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00) .152 (.359) 1.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00)






















































































Number of Observations: 906,339 275,527 630,812 8,976 1,364 7,612
Table 2: Means of Variables Related to Motorists.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.
23percent of the searches were conducted at night (recall 30.3 percent of the stops were at night).
79.2 percent of searches were not successful (they yielded nothing). Drugs were the most common
contraband seized in successful searches (15.1 percent of total searches), followed by alcohol/tobacco
(2.1 percent) and drug paraphernalia (1.5 percent).
Table 3 summarizes the means of variables related to the troopers in our sample. The ﬁrst
column shows that in our data, blacks, Hispanics and whites account for 13.7, 10, and 76.3 percent
of the troopers respectively. 89 percent of the troopers are male. The second and the third columns
show that white troopers conducted 73 percent of all stops and 86 percent of all searches. The
corresponding numbers for black troopers are 16 and 4.6 percent; for Hispanic troopers they are
11.4 and 9.5 percent. Female troopers conducted 9.3 percent of all stops and 6.9 percent of all
searches.
5.3 Examining the Assumption that Troopers Face the Same Population of
Motorists
Before we conduct our tests of monolithic behavior and racial prejudice we ﬁrst examine whether
a crucial assumption of our test, that all troopers face the same population of motorists, is sat-





 (	)a n d	 are all unobservable. The best we can do is to examine the
distribution of observable motorist characteristics faced by troopers of diﬀerent races. Table 4
shows the proportions of stopped motorists with given characteristics faced by troopers of diﬀerent
races. The characteristics of motorists reported in the table include race, gender, age, and time
of the stops. For each row, we also report in the last column the -values for Pearson 2 tests
of the null hypothesis that the proportions of stopped motorists with the characteristics speciﬁc
to that row are the same for all three racial groups of troopers. As one can see, the hypothesis
that troopers of diﬀerent races face the same population of motorists can be statistically rejected
in the raw data, even though the diﬀerences are numerically quite small. One may suspect that
the reason that troopers of diﬀerent races are stopping motorists with diﬀerent characteristics is
that black, Hispanic and white troopers are assigned to diﬀerent troops. For example, Hispanic
troopers are likely to have an over-representation in Troop E (covering Miami in Dade County)
relative to Troop A and H (covering counties in the Florida Panhandle). Indeed, Table 5 shows
that the allocations of troopers of diﬀerent races to diﬀerent troops, and time of assignment, do
not seem random in the raw data. For this reason, we think it is important to conduct the re-
sampling methods we described in Subsection 3.2.42 By construction, in the reweighted data we
42One may argue that all of the stops occurred on Florida highways, and the drug ﬂow in Florida tends to go
from Miami (a city in the southern tip of Florida) to cities in the northeastern United States; that is, drug couriers
are moving throughout Florida (except for possibly the panhandle). Thus troopers stationed in diﬀerent areas are
24Troopers Stops Searches
Troopers’ All All By Trooper Sex All By Trooper Sex
























































































































































Table 3: Means of Variables Related to Troopers.












White Male .679 .684 .701 .001
Night stops .288 .272 .318 .001
Age: 16-30 .471 .460 .445 .001
Age: 31-45 .325 .341 .349 0.02
Black Male .671 .667 .686 .001
Night stops .332 .308 .354 .001
Age: 16-30 .514 .514 .507 .001
Age: 31-45 .340 .344 .356 0.03
Hispanic Male .783 .774 .761 .001
Night stops .322 .288 .393 .001
Age: 16-30 .516 .497 .494 .001
Age: 31-45 .350 .363 .355 0.01
Table 4: Distribution of Characteristics of Stopped Motorists, by Trooper Race in the Raw Data.
created with the resampling method, troopers of a given race are assigned to diﬀerent troops with
the same probabilities. The Pearson 2 test also reveals that in the reweighted sample troopers of
diﬀerent races are assigned to night shifts with the same probability. Thus we can maintain our
hypothesis that the distribution of the observable characteristics of the stopped motorists faced by
troopers are the same in the reweighted sample. We report our test results below using data from
the reweighted samples.
5.4 Empirical Result for the Test of Monolithic Trooper Behavior
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 1 in the introduction. Panel A shows two facts:
ﬁrst, regardless of motorists’ race, white oﬃcers search the highest percentage of the motorists they
stop, and black oﬃcers search the lowest percentage; second, for all oﬃcers’ races, the percentage
of black motorists searched is higher than Hispanic motorists, which in turn is higher than white
motorists.
We now implement our test for determining whether troopers of diﬀerent races exhibit mono-
lithic behavior in their search decisions. Recall that we said that if troopers are monolithic they
will all search a given race of motorists at the same rate. Thus we need to test whether or not the
likely to face similar population of drivers, and the diﬀerences in the stopped motorists’ characteristics reﬂect the
diﬀerences in stop behavior of the troopers of diﬀerent races, rather than the diﬀerences in the driver population. It
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% Night Stops .283 (.172) .284 (.192) .349 (.179)
Table 5: Proportion of Troopers with Diﬀerent Races by Troop and Time Assignment in the Raw
Data.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses
search rates that are given in Panel A of Table 1 diﬀer among trooper racial groups for a given
group of motorists. To accomplish this, we compute the -values from the Pearson 2 test under
the null hypothesis that troopers of all races search race- motorists with equal probability. These
- v a l u e sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e1. Speciﬁcally, the Pearson’s 2 test statistic under the null hypothesis




\  (;) − \  ()
´2
\  (;)
∼ 2 ( − 1)
where \  (;) is the estimated search probability of race- oﬃcers against race- motorists,
\  () is the estimated search probability against race- motorists unconditional on the race of
the oﬃcer, and  is the cardinality of the set of troopers’ race categories R The -value for a
given motorist race gives the signiﬁcance level above which we can reject the null hypothesis that
the three search rates corresponding to that row are equal, which is the prediction under the null
hypothesis of monolithic behavior. Because that all the -values are less than 0.001, this provides
strong evidence against monolithic trooper behavior.
Panel B presents the average search success rate for given motorist/trooper race pairs. The ﬁrst
ﬁnding from Panel B is exactly converse to the ﬁrst ﬁnding from Panel A: for any given motorist
27race, black oﬃcers’ average search success rate is higher than that of Hispanic oﬃcers, which in
turn is higher than that of white oﬃcers. To test for monolithic behavior, we need to see whether
all racial groups of troopers have the same average search success rate against a given racial group
of motorists. The -value in each row is from the Pearson 2 test under the null hypothesis that
troopers of all races have the same average search success rate against motorists of the race in that
speciﬁc row. Again the Pearson 2 test statistic under the null hypothesis that all troopers with




\  (;) − \  ()
´2
\  (;)
∼ 2 ( − 1)
where \  (;) is the estimated average search success rate of race- oﬃcers against race-
motorists, and \  () is the estimated average search success rate against race- motorists un-
conditional on the race of the oﬃcers. All -values are less than 001 which again provides strong
evidence against monolithic trooper behavior.
The second ﬁnding from Panel B is that, for all oﬃcers, the average search success rate is
highest against white motorists, followed in order by black and Hispanic motorists. Though this
ﬁnding is not directly related to our test for monolithic behavior, it provides strong support for
our modelling assumption that the distributions of unobservable characteristics for motorists of
diﬀerent races may be very diﬀerent, not only in means but also in higher moments. For example,
Panel A shows that black oﬃcers search about the same percentage of white and Hispanic motorists
(0.27 vs. 0.28), but their average search success rate against white motorists are much higher than
that for Hispanic motorists (39.4 vs. 21.0).
5.5 Empirical Result for the Test of Racial Prejudice
We have so far provided strong evidence that troopers do not exhibit monolithic search cri-
teria when deciding whether to search motorists of a given race. Now we describe the results
from our test for racial prejudice as described in subsection 4.2. Under the null hypothesis that
none of the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced, we argued that the rank order over
the search rates  (;)(;)a n d (;) and the rank order over the average search
success rates  (;)(;)a n d (;) should both be independent of  From the
e s t i m a t e dm e a ns e a r c hr a t e sa n da v e r a g es e a r c hs u c c e s sr a t e si nT a b l e1, we know that, for all
 ∈ { } \  (;)  \  (;)  \  (;) and \  (;)  \  (;)  \  (;) We
can use simple -statistic to formally test that
 (;)  (;) (;) (6)
 (;)  (;) (;) (7)
28For example, let the null hypothesis be  (;)= (;). We can test it against the one-sided
alternative hypothesis  (;) (;)b yu s i n g
 =





where  and 
 are the number of stops conducted by white and Hispanic oﬃcers respectively
against race- motorists, and SVar and SVar
 are respectively the sample variances of the
search dummy variables in the samples of stops against race- motorists conducted by white and
Hispanic oﬃcers. By the Central Limit Theorem (due to our large sample size),  has a standard
normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The null will be rejected in favor of the alternative
at signiﬁcance level  if  ≥  where Φ()=1 −  When  =  the value of the -statistic
is 27.4 under the null, thus we can reject it in favor of the alternative  (;) (;)a t
signiﬁcance level close to 0. Similarly, for the test of the null hypothesis  (;)= (;)
against  (;) (;) we obtain a -statistic of 65, thus again rejecting the null in favor
of the alternative. Implementing this test to other races of motorists, we ﬁnd that the evidence
supports inequality (6)
Analogously we can formally test inequality (7) by using a -test
0 =















 are the number of searches against race- motorists conducted by white and
Hispanic oﬃcers respectively, and SVar0
 and SVar0

 are respectively the sample variances of the
search success dummy variables in the sample of searches against race- motorists conducted by
white and Hispanic oﬃcers. The null will be rejected in favor of the alternative at signiﬁcance level
 if 0 ≤−  where Φ()=1 −  For example when we consider white motorists, we obtain a
-statistic of −3241 for white and Hispanic oﬃcers, thus we are able to reject the null in favor of
the alternative  (;) (;)a tas i g n i ﬁcance level essentially equal to 0 Likewise, we can
reject the null  (;)= (;) in favor of the alternative  (;) (;)a ts i g n i ﬁcance
level close to 0 (with a -statistic of −254) Implementing this test to other races of motorists, we
ﬁnd that the evidence supports inequality (7).
To summarize, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that troopers do not exhibit relative racial
prejudice. Of course, we would like to emphasize caution in interpreting our ﬁnding: while we do
not ﬁnd deﬁnitive evidence of racial prejudice, it is still possible that some or all groups of troopers
are racially prejudiced. If the latter is true, then we have committed a type-II error as a result of
the weak test.
295.6 Other Empirical Implications
It is interesting to note some additional implications from the tests we conducted above. First
of all, inequality (6) implies that the search criterion used by troopers against race- motorists
have the ranking
	∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;) 	 ∗ (;)
In light of Proposition 1, this implies a ranking over the search costs: for any 
(;) (;) (;)
That is, white troopers seem to have smaller costs of searching motorists of any race, followed by
Hispanic troopers. Black troopers have the highest search costs.
Second, as we mentioned at the end of subsection 4.1, our model is refuted if, for each 
the rank order of the search rates against race- motorists  (;)(;)a n d (;)
is not exactly the opposite of the rank order of the corresponding average search success rates
 (;)(;)a n d (;) As we showed above, the statistical evidence in our data does
not refute our model.
5.7 Replicating KPT’s Test
It is useful to contrast our ﬁndings with those from KPT’s test. Recall that KPT’s test relies on
the prediction from their model that, under the null hypothesis of no racial prejudice, the average
search success rates should be independent of the motorists’ race. The last column in Panel B of
Table 1 shows the average search success rate for diﬀerent races of the motorists in the raw data, and
Table 6 shows the -values from Pearson 2 test on the hypothesis that the average search success
rates are equal across various race groupings. Their test immediately implies that the troopers
show racial prejudice against black and Hispanic motorists, especially Hispanics. However, as we
argued, this conclusion is only valid if their model of motorist and trooper behavior is true. We
would like to emphasize, though, that our test does not necessarily refute the presence of racial
prejudice. Our results are simply that, without strong (and possibly untenable) assumptions, we
cannot conﬁdently prove the presence of relative, let alone absolute, racial prejudice.
6 Conclusion
Black and Hispanic motorists in the United States are much more likely than white motorists to
be searched by highway troopers. Is this apparent racial disparity driven by racist preferences by
the troopers, or by motives of eﬀectiveness in interdicting drugs? Our paper presents a simple but
plausible model of police search behavior, and we deﬁne racial prejudice, statistical discrimination
30Average Search
Groupings Success Rate
White, Black, Hispanic  0001
White, Black  0001
White, Hispanic  0001
Black, Hispanic  0001
Table 6: -Values from Pearson’s 2 Tests on the Hypothesis that Average Search Success Rate
are Equal Across Various Groupings: KPT Test.
and monolithic trooper behavior within the conﬁnes of our model. We then exploit the theoretical
predictions from this model to design empirical tests that address the following two questions. Are
police monolithic in their search behavior? Is racial proﬁling in motor vehicle searches motivated
by troopers’ desire for eﬀective policing (statistical discrimination) or by their racial prejudice
(racism)? Relative to the seminal research in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), our model allows
troopers of diﬀerent races to behave diﬀerently, thus allowing us to examine non-monolithic trooper
behavior; moreover, our model does not yield, and the subsequent empirical test does not rely on,
the convenient, but in our view unrealistic, implication that all drivers of the same race carry
contraband with the same probability regardless of characteristics other than race, which is the
vital prediction underlying their tests. We also propose a resampling method to deal with raw
data sets where one of the major assumptions underlying our model and empirical tests is violated.
Our tests require data sets with race information about both the motorists and troopers. When
applied to vehicle stop and search data from Florida, our tests soundly reject the hypothesis that
troopers of diﬀerent races are monolithic in their search behavior, but fail to reject the hypothesis
that troopers of diﬀerent races do not exhibit relative racial prejudice. Finally we would like to
emphasize that our test for racial prejudice is relatively conservative in that we may not always
conclude there is racial prejudice when it is actually present. Although our test is a low-power one,
which implies a high probability that a type-II error will occur, the positive side of this is that
when we do ﬁnd evidence of racial prejudice it is rather conclusive.
Our paper only focuses on the oﬃcers’ search decisions. But the trooper must ﬁrst stop the
motorist prior to a search. In our analysis, we took the sample of cars that are stopped as our
population and focus solely on determining racial prejudice in troopers’ search decisions. Given
data limitations, examining the possibility of racial prejudice in highway stops is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, it is possible that the racial prejudice of police oﬃcers are reﬂe c t e di nt h e i r
stop decisions as well as (or instead of) their search decisions. Because our model allows for general
diﬀerences in the unobservable distributions among motorists of diﬀerent races, the presence (or
31lack thereof) of racial prejudice at the stop level should not aﬀect our conclusions about additional
racial prejudice in the search decisions. Investigating racial bias in stops is clearly an important
topic for future research, when suitable data sets that include random samples of drivers on the
road become available.
Finally, our proposed test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches in the presence of infra-
marginality and omitted variable problems may also be applicable to detect racial prejudice in
mortgage lending. The analog of troopers of diﬀerent races in the context of mortgage lending is
banks operating in the same metropolitan area, for example, the analog of search rates by driver
races will be mortgage denial rates by applicant races, and the analog of search success rates is
mortgage default rates. The test developed in this paper suggests that the comparison of mortgage
denial rates and default rates for banks operating in the same metropolitan area can potentially
reveal (relative) racial prejudice of the banks.
A Appendix: A Model with Endogenous Drug Carrying Deci-
sions.
In Section 3 we assumed that the proportion of motorists in race group  is exogenously given
as  ∈ (01) For the purpose of testing for monolithic behavior and racial prejudice, this partial
equilibrium approach suﬃces. However, for other purposes such as public policy considerations
like reducing crimes and the “war on drugs,” one may want to know how any changes in trooper
behavior may aﬀect the motorists’ drug carrying decisions.43 One needs an equilibrium model
to address such questions. In this appendix, we propose a simple model. We show that closing
our partial equilibrium model in Section 3 is easy; moreover, such an equilibrium model has nice
equilibrium uniqueness properties under reasonable conditions. This is in contrast to the labor
market statistical discrimination models where multiple equilibria naturally arise and are the driving
force for statistical discrimination (see, among others, Coate and Loury 1993).
Consider a single motorist race group  and two trooper racial groups,  and 0
44 Suppose
that in the trooper population a fraction  is of race  and the remainder fraction 1− is of race
0
 Suppose that Nature draws for each driver a utility cost of carrying contraband  ∈ R+ from
CDF  with a continuous density. The utility cost  represents feelings of fear experienced by a
driver from the act of carrying contraband. If a driver carries contraband and is not caught, he/she
derives a beneﬁto f0 If a guilty driver is searched and thus arrested, he/she experiences an
43See Persico (2002) for an analysis on how racially blind search policies may aﬀect the total crimes committed by
motorists.
44Because we are only considering one race group of motorists, we will omit  from the subsequent notation.
Having more than one racical groups of motorists will not change any of the results below.
32additional cost (over and above )o f If a driver does not carry contraband, he/she does not
incur the utility cost of  But the inconvenience experienced by an innocent driver when he/she is
searched is denoted by  Naturally we assume that   . We assume that a driver’s realization
of  is his or her private information;  and  are constants known to all drivers and police
oﬃcers. Each driver decides whether to carry contraband.
As before, we normalize the beneﬁto fe a c ha r r e s tt ot h ep o l i c eo ﬃcer to be one, and for
notational simplicity, the cost of search for a race- trooper is written as  ∈ (01)a n dt h a tf o r
ar a c e - 0
 trooper is 0
 ∈ (01) As in Section 3, troopers observe noisy but informative signals
regarding whether or not a driver is carrying contraband: if a driver is guilty, the signal 	 ∈ [01]i s
drawn from PDF 
 (·); if the driver is not guilty, then 	 is drawn from PDF 




is strictly increasing in 	 Let  and  denote the corresponding CDFs of 
 and 
 We assume
that a trooper wants to maximize the total number of convictions minus the cost of searching cars.
We ﬁrst suppose that a proportion  of drivers choose to carry contraband and analyze the
optimal search behavior of the troopers. Let Pr(|	) denote the posterior probability that a driver





 (	)+( 1 − )
 (	)

A race- trooper will decide to search a driver with signal 	 if and only if
Pr(|	) −  ≥ 0;
which, from the MLRP, is equivalent to 	 ≥ 	∗
 ()w h e r e	∗
 () ∈ [01] is the unique solution to
Pr(|	)=
Obviously 	∗
() is strictly decreasing in  Similarly, race-0
 troopers will search a motorist if and
only if the motorist’s signal 	 exceeds 	∗




Now suppose that race- and race-0
 troopers use search criteria of 	∗
 and 	∗
0 respectively.
The expected payoﬀ of a driver with utility cost  from carrying contraband is given by




























where Term 1 is the probability of not being caught multiplied by the beneﬁt from drugs if the
motorist is not caught. Note that a fraction  of the troopers are of race- and use a search
criterion of 	∗
 and 1− of the troopers use 	∗











 Term 2 is the expected probability of being caught multiplied by the
33cost of being caught with illicit drugs. Of course, the driver suﬀers a disutility  whenever he or
she carries drugs.
The expected payoﬀ of a driver, whose utility cost is  from not carrying contraband is simply












































































Thus if the troopers follow search criteria 	∗
 and 	∗
0 respectively, the proportion of drivers who will



































The existence of equilibrium follows directly from Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem. Now we show
that in fact for any CDF  with non-negative support (i.e.,  ∈ R+) the equilibrium is unique.
Suppose that there are two equilibria in which the proportion of guilty motorists are  and ˜  with

























































































 Since ∗ (00)  0 and the support































cannot be part of the equilibrium (because if
 =0  the optimal thresholds should be 1 from the troopers’ best response). Thus in both equilibria


























 That is, both equilibria
lie in the region where ∗ (··) is strictly increasing in both arguments. If ˜  equilibrium con-
ditions (A2) and (A3) imply that 	∗
  ˜ 	
∗
 and 	∗
0  ˜ 	
∗














B u tt h e ni ti m p l i e st h a t˜  a contradiction.
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